MOTION FOR JUDGMENT AND ORDER OF PAYMENTS June 12, 2023 (2024)

Case

BARCLAYS BANK DELAWARE v. GUAILLAS ACOSTA, GALO

Aug 09, 2024 |S00 - Small Claims - Small Claims - Collection - Credit Card (Original Owner) |FST-CV24-6068553-S

Case

LVNV FUNDING LLC v. RUFFIN, KATRESH

Aug 08, 2024 |S15 - Small Claims - Small Claims - Collection - Purchase Debt |FST-CV24-6068541-S

Case

LVNV FUNDING LLC v. JOSEPH-TUCKER, ALICIA

Aug 08, 2024 |S15 - Small Claims - Small Claims - Collection - Purchase Debt |FBT-CV24-6136964-S

Case

LVNV FUNDING LLC v. MCALLASTER, KIYSHON T

Aug 05, 2024 |S15 - Small Claims - Small Claims - Collection - Purchase Debt |FBT-CV24-6136798-S

Case

MIDLAND CREDIT MANAGEMENT, INC v. ROBLES, ADDIS

Aug 05, 2024 |S15 - Small Claims - Small Claims - Collection - Purchase Debt |FBT-CV24-6136785-S

Case

BROOK LEDGE, INC. DBA BROOK LEDGE HORSE TRANSPORTA v. RAE, LLC DBA RABBIT HILL FARM

Aug 08, 2024 |C40 - Contracts - Collections |DBD-CV24-6051221-S

Case

BARCLAYS BANK DELAWARE v. NUNEZ, KEVIN

Aug 08, 2024 |S00 - Small Claims - Small Claims - Collection - Credit Card (Original Owner) |DBD-CV24-6051210-S

Case

CAVALRY SPV I , LLC v. WRIGHT, CLIVE

Aug 05, 2024 |S15 - Small Claims - Small Claims - Collection - Purchase Debt |FBT-CV24-6136796-S

Case

RIVERA, JAY I. v. 39 SPRING ST., LLC Et Al

Aug 09, 2024 |H20 - Housing - Housing - Housing Code Enforcement |HFH-CV24-5008543-S

Ruling

Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. vs. Towe

Aug 08, 2024 |24CVG-00197

WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A. VS. TOWECase Number: 24CVG-00197Tentative Ruling on Motion for Order Deeming Truth of the Matters Specified in Plaintiff’s Requests forAdmissions as Admitted: Plaintiff Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. seeks an order deeming the truth of matters specifiedin Plaintiff’s Request for Admissions, Set One as admitted by Defendant Kevin R. Towe. Despite being timelyserved, Defendant did not file an Opposition.When a party fails to respond to a request for admission, the requesting party may move for an order deeming thegenuineness of documents and the truth of matters specified in the requests admitted. CCP § 2033.280(b). Failureto respond also waives any objections to the discovery propounded. CCP § 2033.280(a). Plaintiff’s moving paperssufficiently demonstrate that Defendant has failed to respond to the Request for Admissions within the requiredtime frame.Unlike a motion to compel further responses, a motion to compel responses when no responses have beenprovided does not require the propounding party to demonstrate good cause or that it satisfied a meet-and-conferrequirement. Sinaiko Healthcare Consulting, Inc. v. Pacific Healthcare Consultants (2007) 148 Cal. App. 4th390. Despite there being no requirement to meet and confer, Plaintiff sent a meet and confer letter to Defendantprior to filing the motion.Monetary sanctions are mandatory per CCP § 2033.280(c), however, Plaintiff did not seek monetary sanctionsand provided no evidence regarding attorney’s fees or other costs associated with bringing the motion. Sanctionsshould only be imposed for “reasonable” expenses. CCP § 2023.030. The Court does not have information uponwhich to make a finding that any amount of sanctions were for reasonable expenses and should not imposesanctions.The motion is GRANTED. Defendant is deemed to have admitted as true each of the items contained inPlaintiff’s Request for Admissions, Set One. Objections are waived. Plaintiff provided a proposed Order,however it is inadequate. Plaintiff is to submit a proposed Order that includes a copy of the Requests forAdmissions being deemed admitted.****************************************************************************************** 9:00 a.m. – Review Hearings******************************************************************************************

Ruling

WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A. VS. RUSHD J ODTALLAH SR

Aug 07, 2024 |CGC19577702

Matter on the Law & Motion calendar for Wednesday, August 7, 2024, Line 3. PLAINTIFF WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A.'s Motion To Vacate Judgment And Of Nonappearance. Plaintiff's unopposed motion to vacate judgment is granted. For the 9:30 a.m. Law & Motion calendar, all attorneys and parties may appear in Department 302 remotely. Remote hearings will be conducted by videoconference using Zoom. To appear remotely at the hearing, go to the court's website at sfsuperiorcourt.org under "Online Services," navigate to "Tentative Rulings," and click on the appropriate link, or dial the corresponding phone number. Any party who contests a tentative ruling must send an email to contestdept302tr@sftc.org with a copy to all other parties by 4pm stating, without argument, the portion(s) of the tentative ruling that the party contests. The subject line of the email shall include the line number, case name and case number. The text of the email shall include the name and contact information, including email address, of the attorney or party who will appear at the hearing. Counsel for the prevailing party is required to prepare a proposed order which repeats verbatim the substantive portion of the tentative ruling and must email it to contestdept302tr@sftc.org prior to the hearing even if the tentative ruling is not contested. The court no longer provides a court reporter in the Law & Motion Department. Parties may retain their own reporter, who may appear in the courtroom or remotely. A retained reporter must be a California certified court reporter (CSR), for only a CSR's transcript may be used in California courts. If a CSR is being retained, include in your email all of the following: their name, CSR and telephone numbers, and their individual work email address. =(302/RBU)

Ruling

PMIG FINANCIAL, LLC VS. CHRISTINA RANGEL ET AL

Aug 06, 2024 |CGC17559532

Matter on the Law & Motion Calendar for Tuesday, August 6, 2024, Line 10. PLAINTIFF PMIG FINANCIAL, LLC's HEARING ON CLAIM OF EXEMPTION. The judgment debtor's claim of exemption is denied. The levying officer shall withhold $35 per pay period ($70 per month) from debtor's earnings and pay that sum to the judgment creditor. For the 9:30 a.m. Law & Motion calendar, all attorneys and parties may appear in Department 302 remotely. Remote hearings will be conducted by videoconference using Zoom. To appear remotely at the hearing, go to the court's website at sfsuperiorcourt.org under "Online Services," navigate to "Tentative Rulings," and click on the appropriate link, or dial the corresponding phone number. Any party who contests a tentative ruling must send an email to contestdept302tr@sftc.org with a copy to all other parties by 4pm stating, without argument, the portion(s) of the tentative ruling that the party contests. The subject line of the email shall include the line number, case name and case number. The text of the email shall include the name and contact information, including email address, of the attorney or party who will appear at the hearing. If the court adopts the tentative ruling, it will execute a judicial council form of order reflecting the tentative. The court no longer provides a court reporter in the Law & Motion Department. Parties may retain their own reporter, who may appear in the courtroom or remotely. A retained reporter must be a California certified court reporter (CSR), for only a CSR's transcript may be used in California courts. If a CSR is being retained, include in your email all of the following: their name, CSR and telephone numbers, and their individual work email address. =(302/RBU)

Ruling

SECURITY CREDIT SERVICES, LLC VS. GLENN A. KINARD et al

Aug 08, 2024 |CGC11513518

Real Property/Housing Court Law and Motion Calendar for Thursday, August 8, 2024, line 1. ASSIGNEE PERRYVILLE RECOVERY CORPORATION's ( C/O BREWER & BREWER LLP ) Motion For Order Assigning Sums Due Or That Will Be Due Judgment Debtor From Rental Of Real Property. GRANTED. No opposition filed. = (501/CFH) Parties may appear in-person, telephonically or via Zoom (Video - Webinar ID: 160 560 5023; Password: 172849; or Phone Dial in: (669) 254-5252; Webinar ID: 160 560 5023; Password: 172849). Parties who intend to appear at the hearing must give notice to opposing parties and the court promptly, but no later than 4:00 p.m. the court day before the hearing unless the tentative ruling has specified that a hearing is required. Notice of contesting a tentative ruling shall be provided by sending an email to the court to Department501ContestTR@sftc.org with a copy to all other parties stating, without argument, the portion(s) of the tentative ruling that the party contests. A party may not argue at the hearing if the opposing party is not so notified, and the opposing party does not appear.

Ruling

SOMA SURGERY CENTER, INC., A CALIFORNIA CORPORATION VS BYRON SANDOVAL, ET AL.

Aug 09, 2024 |23SMCV05453

Case Number: 23SMCV05453 Hearing Date: August 9, 2024 Dept: 205 Superior Court of California County of Los Angeles West District Beverly Hills Courthouse / Department 205 SOMA SURGERY CENTER, INC., Plaintiff, v. BYRON SANDOVAL, et al., Defendants. Case No.: 23SMCV05453 Hearing Date: August 9, 2024 [TENTATIVE] ORDER RE: DEFENDANT LAW OFFICES OF MARILU MORENO SCHLICHTS MOTION TO SET ASIDE DEFAULT AND DEFAULT JUDGMENT BACKGROUND This is a breach of contract case. Plaintiff Soma Surgery Center and Defendant Law Offices of Marilu Moreno-Schlicht entered into a written contract wherein Plaintiff agreed to provide various medical examinations, treatment and care to the law offices personal injury clients on a lien basis. Plaintiff alleges Defendant failed to pay. On November 20, 2023, Plaintiff filed a complaint alleging two claims for (1) breach of contract and (2) unjust enrichment. On November 21, 2023, Defendant was served via substitute service (with mailing of the Summons and Complaint on November 22, 2023). Defendants response to the Complaint was due on or before January 2, 2024. A response was not filed. (Miskabi Decl. ¶ 4.) On January 15, 2024, Plaintiff's counsel e-mailed Defendant as a professional courtesy and informed her that a response to the Complaint was not filed and was overdue (as it was due on January 2, 2024). Plaintiff's counsel informed Defendant that if a response was not filed on or before January 19, 2024, a default and default judgment would be obtained. A response was still not timely filed. (Miskabi Decl. ¶ 5, Exh. A.) On January 22, 2024, after Defendants response was not filed, Plaintiff filed and obtained a default against Defendant. (Miskabi Decl., ¶ 6, Exh. B.) In early February 2024, Plaintiff and Defendant spoke telephonically about the matter and Plaintiff informed Defendant for a second time that a response was not yet filed and was overdue and that a default was entered against Defendant. (Miskabi Decl., ¶ 7, Exh. A.) On February 13, 2024, Plaintiff's counsel emailed Defendant reminding her for a third time that a response to the complaint was not filed and was overdue and outlining steps to address setting aside the default, steps which were discussed telephonically in early February 2024. (Miskabi Decl., ¶ 8, Exh. A.) A response to this email was not received. On May 1, 2024, Plaintiffs counsel first became aware of an answer and cross-complaint filed by Defendant which were not served on Plaintiff. Plaintiff demanded service of the answer and cross-complaint. (Miskabi Decl., ¶ 9, Exh. A.) A response to this email was not received. On May 20, 2024, the Court held a case management conference (CMC). Defendant did not attend the CMC. This hearing is on Defendants motion to set aside default. Defendant argues that default must be set aside because of its counsels mistake, inadvertence and neglect. Specifically, counsel was severely ill, mostly bed-ridden and unable to oversee her cases; her staff was inexperienced with litigation matters and failed to apprise her that a default had been entered, and there was a staffing turnover which contributed to the mistakes and oversight. LEGAL STANDARD Code Civ. Proc. §473, subd. (b)¿provides for two distinct types of relief from a default -- commonly differentiated as discretionary and mandatory. Under the¿discretionary relief provision, on a showing of mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or¿excusable neglect, the court has discretion to allow relief from default. Under the mandatory relief provision, on the other hand, upon a showing by attorney declaration of mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or neglect, the court must vacate any resulting default judgment or dismissal entered. (Leader v. Health Industries of America, Inc.¿(2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 603, 615-616.)¿ Applications seeking relief under the mandatory provision of¿§473¿must be accompanied by an attorneys sworn affidavit attesting to his or her mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or neglect. (Code Civ. Proc. §473, subd. (b).) The mandatory provision further adds that whenever relief is granted based on an attorneys affidavit of fault [the court shall] direct the attorney to pay reasonable compensatory legal fees and costs to opposing counsel or parties. (Id.) The application for relief must be made no more than six months after the judgment, dismissal, order, or proceeding was taken. (Id.) And the application must be accompanied by a copy of the answer or other pleading proposed to be filed therein. (Id.) It is settled that the law favors a trial on the¿merits. . . and therefore liberally construes¿section¿473. (Bonzer v. City of Huntington Park (1993) 20 Cal.App.4th 1474, 1477.) Doubts in applying¿section 473 are resolved in favor of the party seeking¿relief from¿default. . . and if that party has moved promptly for¿default relief,¿only slight evidence will justify an order granting such¿relief. (Id. at 1477-78.) DISCUSSION Relief from default is mandatory when the defaulting partys attorney files an affidavit attesting to the attorneys mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or neglect even if the attorney's neglect was inexcusable. (Rodrigues v. Superior Court (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 1027, 1033.) If the prerequisites for the application of the mandatory provision of section 473, subdivision (b) exist, the trial court does not have discretion to refuse relief. (Gee v. Greyhound Lines, Inc. (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 477, 484 [internal citation omitted].) However, mandatory relief is not available when the attorney and client are the same. Where attorney and client had no separate existence, granting mandatory relief would allow an attorney essentially representing herself a benefit denied to other self-represented litigants. (McClain v. Kissler (2019) 39 Cal.App.5th 399, 435-428.) The concern that not granting mandatory relief would spawn a malpractice action is also not implicated where counsel and client are the same. Here, defense counsel does not dispute the client and the attorney in this instance are the same, and in fact, her reply concedes mandatory relief is not available in this case. (Reply at 4:11-15.) Notwithstanding, the Court concludes discretionary relief is appropriate due to counsels excusable neglect. Defendants attorney was seriously ill and mostly bedridden during the period of time in which Defendants responsive pleading was due, and the default was entered. (Moreno Decl. ¶ 2.) Defendants attorney concedes that, in hindsight, she should have withdrawn from some of her litigation cases, but she mistakenly believed that her staff (who are well versed in pre-litigation matters) would inform her of any important updates on these cases. (Id.) Counsels staff failed to inform counsel that a default had been entered before the answer was filed. Plaintiff tentatively agreed to set aside the default if an answer and cross-complaint was filed quickly. (Schlict Decl. ¶ 4.) Default was entered on January 22, 2024, and Defendant filed its answer on January 26, 2024, but Plaintiff did not ask the Court to set aside the default. Defendants staff erroneously believed the default issue had been resolved because Plaintiff agreed to set aside the default if an answer and cross-complaint was filed quickly, which it was. Defendants staff and did not apprise counsel that the default was entered before the filing of the answer. (Schlict Decl. ¶ 5.) Counsel only learned of this mistake in or around May 2024, upon a review of her cases. (Moreno Decl. ¶ 3.) Counsel then moved to set aside default within a month of discovering the mistake. Defendant argues that counsels neglect was inexcusable, pointing to counsels failure to respond to numerous emails and telephone calls, warning of an impending default and later outlining steps to address setting aside the default. But the communications were between Plaintiffs counsel and Defendants office staff, not defense counsel, which was part of the problem because the staff failed to bring the default to defense counsels attention. The Court also finds compelling the fact that Defendant agreed to set aside default if an answer was filed quickly, which it was. The answer was filed just four days after default was entered. Plaintiff argues this case is nearly identical to Davis v. Thayer (1980) 113 Cal.App.3d 892. Not so. In Davis, the defendant stated a combination of excuses for not responding to the complaint: she was under doctors care for a recent heart attack and taking valium, and she was caring for her elderly mother and husband who were ill during that time. Because of this, the Davis defendant gave the litigation documents to her son who stated that he would take care of the problem. (113 Cal.App.3d at 900.) The Davis court found the defendants neglect inexcusable for a number of reasons: (1) she did not state the severity of the condition or in what manner it limited her activity, nor did she present a doctors declaration to confirm her statements; (2) despite her poor health, she was caring for two sick relatives and the mere fact that the client is busy and occupied with other affairs is never held to constitute an excuse for his neglect to answer a summons within time; (3) she handed over the papers to her son to take care of the problem, but this seemed ill-advised and she never followed up with him; and (4) the defendants declaration and her proposed answer contained discrepancies with regards to her involvement in the underlying business. (Id. at 909-910.) In contrast to Davis, counsel here clearly stated the severity of her condition in that she was seriously ill and mostly bedridden. Counsels declaration under penalty of perjury is sufficient, without the further need for a declaration from counsels doctor. Moreover, unlike Davis, there are no facts here to dispute counsels claim that she was seriously ill, such as taking care of relatives while at the same time claiming to be sick. Further, counsel does not claim she was too busy to respond, and while her staff was inexperienced in dealing with defaults, they were not an inexperienced layman like the son in Davis. As such, Davis is distinguishable and not controlling. In the event default is set aside, Defendant argues it is entitled to attorneys fees. But the Code only provides for attorneys fees in the event mandatory relief is granted based on an attorneys affidavit of fault. (Code Civ. Proc. § 473(b).) Here, the Court is not granting mandatory relief. In sum, given the strong policy favoring a disposition of cases on their merits, the Court will set aside the default. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS the motion to set aside default. DATED: August 9, 2024 ___________________________ Edward B. Moreton, Jr. Judge of the Superior Court

Ruling

Onemain Financial Group LLC vs Alexis J Ramos

Tentative not yet posted, please check again.

Ruling

AMERICAN EXPRESS NATIONAL BANK, ET AL. VS MICHAEL J DUDA

Aug 09, 2024 |20BBCV00576

Case Number: 20BBCV00576 Hearing Date: August 9, 2024 Dept: A LOS ANGELES SUPERIOR COURT NORTH CENTRAL DISTRICT - BURBANK DEPARTMENT A TENTATIVE RULING AUGUST 9, 2024 MOTION TO VACATE DISMISSAL AND ENTER JUDGMENT Los Angeles Superior Court Case # 20BBCV00576 MP: American Express National Bank (Plaintiff) RP: Michael J. Duda (Defendant) [No Opposition Rendered] NOTICE: The Court is not requesting oral argument on this matter. The Court is guided by California Rules of Court, Rule 3.1308(a)(1) whereby notice of intent to appear is requested. Unless the Court directs argument in the Tentative Ruling, no argument is requested and any party seeking argument should notify all other parties and the court by 4:00 p.m. on the court day before the hearing of the partys intention to appear and argue. The tentative ruling will become the ruling of the court if no argument is received. Notice may be given either by email at BurDeptA@LACourt.org or by telephone at (818) 260-8412. ALLEGATIONS: American Express National Bank (Amex) brings this action against Michael J. Duda (Defendant). On April 5, 2021, the parties stipulated to the entry of a conditional judgment against Defendant in the amount of $34,852.52. The Court granted the stipulation, and the conditional judgment was entered. As condition of this entry, Amex agreed to conditionally dismiss the action against Defendant pursuant to C.C.P. § 664.6. Amex now moves to vacate its conditional dismissal and enter judgment against Defendant pursuant to the terms of the stipulation. Amex seeks entry of judgment in the amount of $20,902.52. Amex also seeks to recover costs in the amount of $77.19 occurred in connection with the filing of this motion. Amexs motion is unopposed, and the memorandum of costs has not been disputed. ANALYSIS: I. LEGAL STANDARD C.C.P. § 664.6(a) provides: If parties to pending litigation stipulate, in a writing signed by the parties outside of the presence of the court or orally before the court, for settlement of the case, or part thereof, the court, upon motion, may enter judgment pursuant to the terms of the settlement. If requested by the parties, the court may retain jurisdiction over the parties to enforce the settlement until performance in full of the terms of the settlement. II. MERITS Amex has sufficiently demonstrated that the parties stipulated to the entry of judgment against Defendant in this matter in the event Defendant ceased making settlement payments. (See Exh A ¶ 2.) Amex represents that Defendant made $ 13,950.00 in settlement payments but thereafter stopped paying the settlement. (Keith Decl. ¶¶ 9,10.) Despite notice to Defendant of his default, Defendant remains in arrears on the settlement. (Keith Decl. ¶ 11, Exh. C.) Amex states that the remaining balance for the stipulated settlement is $20,902.52. (Keith Decl. ¶ 12.) Pursuant to the stipulation, judgment is to be entered in favor of Amex in the amount of $20,979.71, including $20,902.52 in principal and $77.19 in costs. The court will sign Amexs proposed Order and enter the proposed Judgment. --- RULING: In the event the parties submit on this tentative ruling, or a party requests a signed order or the court in its discretion elects to sign a formal order, the following form will be either electronically signed or signed in hard copy and entered into the courts records. ORDER American Express National Banks Motion to Vacate Dismissal and Enter Judgment came on regularly for hearing on August 9, 2024, with appearances/submissions as noted in the minute order for said hearing, and the court, being fully advised in the premises, did then and there rule as follows: THE MOTION TO VACATE DISMISSAL AND ENTER JUDGMENT PURSUANT TO THE TERMS OF THE STIPULATED JUDGMENT IS GRANTED. AMERICAN EXPRESS NATIONAL BANK TO GIVE NOTICE. IT IS SO ORDERED. DATE: August 9, 2024 _______________________________ F.M. TAVELMAN, Judge Superior Court of California County of Los Angeles

Ruling

DESERT PASSAGE COMMUNITY ASSOCIATION VS GABRIEL SERRATO, ET AL.

Aug 07, 2024 |Echo Dawn Ryan |20STCP03969

Case Number: 20STCP03969 Hearing Date: August 7, 2024 Dept: 26 Desert Passage COA. v. Serrato, et al., et al.MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS FEES AND COSTS(CCP § 685.040) TENTATIVE RULING: Plaintiff Desert Passage Community Associations Motion for Award of Attorney Fees and Costs is GRANTED IN THE AMOUNT OF $2,232.50 IN ATTORNEY FEES AND $693.60 IN COSTS. ANALYSIS: On September 26, 2016, the Justice Court, Maricopa-Stanfield Precinct, County of Pinal, State of Arizona entered judgment in favor of Plaintiff Desert Passage Community Association (Plaintiff) in the action entitled Desert Passage Community Association v. Gabriel Serrato and Monica Serrato in Case No. CV2017-0049. The default judgment was entered in the principal sum of $2,145.21, plus interest and reasonable attorneys fees and costs against Defendants Gabriel Serrato and Monica Serrato (collectively, Defendants). On December 2, 2020, this Court entered judgment based on the sister-state judgment in Case No. CV2017-0049. On October 19, 2022, the Court granted Plaintiffs first Motion for Attorneys Fees and Costs. (Minute Order, 10/19/22.) Plaintiff brings the instant Motion for Attorneys Fees and Costs, filed on June 3, 2024. To date, no opposition has been filed. Discussion Request for Judicial Notice The Motion is accompanied by a request for judicial notice of the (1) Declaration of Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions for Desert Passage recorded in the Pinal County, Arizona Recorder's Office on December 30, 2004 as Instrument No. 2004-108203; (2) Judgment entered in the Justice Court, Maricopa-Stanfield Precinct, County of Pinal, State of Arizona in the action entitled Desert Passage Community Association v. Gabriel Serrato and Monica Serrato in Case No. CV2017-0049; and (3) Judgment on Sister-State Judgment entered in the above-entitled action, in the Los Angeles County Superior Court, case number 20STCP03969. The request for judicial notice is granted pursuant to Evidence Code section 452, subdivisions (c) and (d). Entitlement to Attorney Fees and Costs The judgment creditor may claim under this section the following costs of enforcing a judgment: . . . (6) Attorney's fees, if allowed by Section 685.040. (Code Civ. Proc., § 685.070, subd. (a).) Code of Civil Procedure, section 685.040 states: The judgment creditor is entitled to the reasonable and necessary costs of enforcing a judgment. Attorneys fees incurred in enforcing a judgment are not included in costs collectible under this title unless otherwise provided by law. Attorneys fees incurred in enforcing a judgment are included as costs collectible under this title if the underlying judgment includes an award of attorneys fees to the judgment creditor pursuant to subparagraph (A) of paragraph (10) of subdivision (a) of Section 1033.5. Also, the motion must be brought with two years of the incurred costs. (Code Civ. Proc., § 685.080, subd. (a).) Based on the award of attorneys fees in the judgment from the sister-state case and the Courts earlier order awarding attorneys fees, Plaintiff is again entitled to attorneys fees incurred enforcing its judgment pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 685.040. (Motion, RJN, Exh. 2, p. 2.) The Motion is timely filed regarding fees incurred from July 1, 2022 and May 31, 2024. Judgment Creditor seeks fees of $2,267.50 and costs of $693.60. (Motion, Bailio Decl., ¶¶17-18.) Calculation of Attorney Fees and Costs The Courts objective is to award attorney fees at the fair market value based on the particular action. (Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1132.) The reasonable hourly rate is that prevailing in the community for similar work. (PLCM Group v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1095.) [T]he fee setting inquiry in California ordinarily begins with the 'lodestar,' i.e., the number of hours reasonably expended multiplied by the reasonable hourly rate . . . . (Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1134.) The lodestar method is based on the factors, as relevant to the particular case: (1) the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, (2) the skill displayed in presenting them, (3) the extent to which the nature of the litigation precluded other employment by the attorneys, (4) the contingent nature of the fee award. (Id. at 1132.) The experienced trial judge is the best judge of the value of professional services rendered in his court, and while his judgment is of course subject to review, it will not be disturbed unless the appellate court is convinced that it is clearly wrong. (Id.) A negative modifier was appropriate when duplicative work had been performed. (Thayer v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 819.) Plaintiff submits the declaration of its attorney, B. Austin Baillio (Baillio), in support of its request for attorney fees. Baillio declares he billed $325.00 per hour until January 1, 2023, after which he billed $375.00 an hour. (Motion, Baillio Decl., ¶6.) During the relevant time, Baillio billed $1,587.50 for 3.1 hours of attorney time. (Id. at ¶¶7, 14 and Exh. A.) The firms paralegals also billed $645.00 for four hours billed at $150.00 to 175.00 per hour. (Id. at ¶¶10-13 and Exh. A, p. 1.) This attorney and paralegal time was spent attending the hearing on the first motion for attorneys fees, searching for Defendants assets, communicating with Judgment Creditor, obtaining and recording an abstract of judgment, and drafting the instant Motion. (Id. at Exh. A.) The Court finds the rates charged by Plaintiffs counsel for the hours billed, and the time billed on collection efforts, reasonable based on the attorneys experience and the limited amount of time spent on collection efforts and this Motion. Accordingly, Plaintiff is awarded attorneys fees of $2,232.50. Plaintiff also seeks an award of $693.60 for investigation, filing fees, appearance fees, and other costs. (Id. at Exh. A, p. 2.) These costs are likewise supported by the attorney declaration and are awarded to Plaintiff. Conclusion Plaintiff Desert Passage Community Associations Motion for Award of Attorney Fees and Costs is GRANTED IN THE AMOUNT OF $2,232.50 IN ATTORNEY FEES AND $693.60 IN COSTS. Moving party to give notice.

Document

CREDIT CORP SOLUTIONS INC v. ROGERS, DELIA

Aug 08, 2024 |S15 - Small Claims - Small Claims - Collection - Purchase Debt |DBD-CV24-6051212-S

Document

JEFFERSON CAPITAL SYSTEMS LLC v. BENNETT, KARISHA

Aug 07, 2024 |C40 - Contracts - Collections |FST-CV24-6068518-S

Document

LVNV FUNDING LLC v. MARTHEL, FLORENCE

Mar 08, 2024 |S15 - Small Claims - Small Claims - Collection - Purchase Debt |FBT-CV24-6132160-S

Document

LVNV FUNDING LLC v. GONCALVES, VANESSA

Aug 07, 2024 |S15 - Small Claims - Small Claims - Collection - Purchase Debt |DBD-CV24-6051195-S

Document

LVNV FUNDING, LLC v. PETERS, MARVIN

Jun 30, 2021 |Kevin M. Tierney |S15 - Small Claims - Small Claims - Collection - Purchase Debt |FST-CV21-6052444-S

Document

VELOCITY INVESTMENTS, LLC v. GWYNN, JEANETTE

Aug 08, 2024 |S15 - Small Claims - Small Claims - Collection - Purchase Debt |FST-CV24-6068522-S

Document

CAVALRY SPV I, LLC v. KNAPP, DOUGLAS G

Aug 03, 2023 |C40 - Contracts - Collections |FBT-CV23-6126058-S

Document

LVNV FUNDING LLC v. DENNIS, MICHELLE ANN

Aug 14, 2023 |S15 - Small Claims - Small Claims - Collection - Purchase Debt |FBT-CV23-6126339-S