NOTICE CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION WITHIN COURT FILING - SOCIAL SECURITY, BANK ACCOUNT, CHARGE, DEBIT AND CREDIT CARD NUMBERS March 09, 2012 (2024)

Case

ELBEN, ULRICH G vs

Aug 07, 2024 |WILL |WILL |2024 WL 001403 NC

Case

FIALA, WARNER R vs

Aug 07, 2024 |WILL |WILL |2024 WL 001406 NC

Case

PORTFOLIO RECOVERY ASSOCIATES LLC vs DUNBAR, KAREEMA

Aug 06, 2024 |LEGLER, KENNEDY B. |SMALL CLAIMS BETWEEN $2,501.01-$5,000 |SMALL CLAIMS BETWEEN $2,501.01-$5,000 |2024 SC 005207 NC

Case

COLON, STEVEN PAUL vs

Aug 07, 2024 |WILLIAMS, CHARLES E |FORMAL - PROBATE |FORMAL - PROBATE |2024 CP 004028 NC

Case

MIGHTY DOG ROOFING A DIVISION OF CAMBER GROUP LLC vs WRIGHT, RACHEL LYNN

Aug 08, 2024 |LEGLER, KENNEDY B. |County Foreclosure $8,001 to $15,000 |County Foreclosure $8,001 to $15,000 |2024 CC 005260 NC

Case

BENVENUTTY, EZIAH vs BROOKS, CAROL

Aug 05, 2024 |BREWER, DANIELLE |INSURANCE CLAIM SOUTH COUNTY |INSURANCE CLAIM SOUTH COUNTY |2024 CA 004018 SC

Case

SUNCOAST CREDIT UNION vs DENNO, LOGAN

Aug 07, 2024 |DENKIN, DAVID LEE |Contract and Indebtedness - $8,001 to $15,000 |Contract and Indebtedness - $8,001 to $15,000 |2024 CC 005231 NC

Case

PORTFOLIO RECOVERY ASSOCIATES LLC vs RYAN, DAWN T

Aug 02, 2024 |LEGLER, KENNEDY B. |SMALL CLAIMS BETWEEN $500.01-$2,500 |SMALL CLAIMS BETWEEN $500.01-$2,500 |2024 SC 005178 NC

Ruling

GARCIA vs KIA AMERICA, INC

Aug 08, 2024 |CVSW2400805

MOTION TO COMPEL RESPONSES TOGARCIA VS KIA AMERICA, PLAINTIFF’S REQUESTS FORCVSW2400805INC PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS SETONE BY JENNY GARCIATentative Ruling:A party may file a motion compelling further answers to requests for production if it finds that theresponse is inadequate, incomplete, or evasive, or an objection in the response is without merit or toogeneral. (CCP § 2031.310.) Unless notice of the motion is given within 45 days of the service of the verifiedresponse, or any supplemental verified response, or on or before any specific later date to which thepropounding party and the responding party have agreed in writing, the propounding party waives anyright to compel a further response. (CCP § 2031.310(c).) The 45-day rule does not begin to run untilverifications are provided. (Golf & Tennis Pro Shop, Inc. v. Sup. Ct. (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 127, 136.) Here,Kia served its unverified responses on 4/23/2024. (Ryu Decl. ¶ 4, Ex. B.) There is no evidence thatverification has been served. Thus, the motion is timely as the 45-day rule has not yet begun to run.Under CCP § 2031.310(b), the parties are required to meet and confer. A single letter followed bya response of refusal may be sufficient in certain circ*mstances to constitute a proper meet andconfer. (Obregon v. Sup. Ct. (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 424, 432.) The court, however, will also consider thetime available before the motion deadline, the extent to which the responding party was complicit in thelapse of time, and the prospects of success through meet and confer. (Id. at 432–33.)Here, Plaintiff sent one letter on 5/7/2024. (Ryu Decl. ¶ 5, Ex. C.) Kia responded on 5/23/2024,offering to further discuss the matter via email or telephone. (Proudfoot ¶ 8, Ex. C.) Rather than continueto meet and confer, Plaintiff filed the instant motion on 6/11/2024. As discussed above, the 45-daydeadline on the motion had not yet begun to run when it was filed. Thus, the Court finds that the partieshave not properly met and conferred regarding the subject discovery.Accordingly, the Court orders the parties to further meet and confer either in person, telephoneor videoconferencing within 10 days of this order. If the parties cannot agree, the parties are ordered tosubmit a joint separate statement of outstanding issues.The court continues the motion and ORDERS the parties to further meet and confer either inperson, telephone or videoconferencing. The court also ORDERS the parties to file a joint separatestatement regarding any outstanding issues.This matter is continued to October 29, 2024, at 8:30 AM to give the parties time to comply.4.LEWING VS CITY OF DEMURRER TO COMPLAINT BY CITYCVSW2403928TEMECULA OF TEMECULATentative Ruling:I. Meet and ConferDefendants have satisfied their obligation to meet and confer pursuant to C.C.P. § 430.41(a).(Decl. of Jacqueline C. Lee at ¶¶ 2-4.)II. Demurrer StandardA general demurrer lies where the pleading does not state facts sufficient to constitute a causeof action. (C.C.P. § 430.10(e).) In evaluating a demurrer, the court gives the pleading a reasonableinterpretation by reading it as a whole and all of its parts in their context. (Moore v. Regents ofUniversity of California (1990) 51 Cal.3d 120, 125.) The court assumes the truth of all material factswhich have been properly pleaded, of facts which may be inferred from those expressly pleaded, and ofany material facts of which judicial notice has been requested and may be taken. (Crowley v. Katleman(1994) 8 Cal.4th 666, 672.) However, a demurrer does not admit contentions, deductions or conclusionsof fact or law. (Daar v. Yellow Cab Company (1967) 67 Cal.2d 695, 713.) If the complaint fails to state acause of action, the court must grant the plaintiff leave to amend if there is a reasonable possibility thatthe defect can be cured by amendment. (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.)III. On the MeritsA. Disability DiscriminationFEHA bars discrimination on the basis of medical condition and physical disability. (Gov. Code§12926(i) & (m).) In order to establish a prima facie case of discrimination, plaintiff must show that heor she: (1) suffered from a disability or was regarded as suffering from a disability; (2) could perform theessential duties of the job with or without reasonable accommodations, and (3) was subjected to anadverse employment action because of the disability or perceived disability. (Sandell v. Taylor-Listug,Inc. (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 297, 310.) “A physical disability may be temporary or short term andincludes not only physical impairments that are actually disabling, but also physical impairments that arepotentially disabling or are perceived as disabling or potentially disabling.” (Ross v. County of Riverside(2019) 36 Cal.App.5th 580, 594.)In the present case, the only reference in the Complaint to a possible disability is Plaintiff'sallegation that after she was told that the investigation into her alleged misconduct had been completedbut Defendant was still investigating Plaintiff's harassment claims, Plaintiff requested time off due to heranxiety, loss of sleep, headaches, and stress. (Complaint at ¶ 29.) It is unclear from the Complaint whatexactly Plaintiff's disability is, and if Defendant knew of her alleged disability. Accordingly, theallegations are insufficient to meet the first element of a claim for disability discrimination. Additionally,Plaintiff does not allege facts showing she could perform the essential duties of the job with or withoutreasonable accommodations. Accordingly, the demurrer to the cause of action for disabilitydiscrimination is sustained with leave to amend.B. Failure to AccommodateThe elements of a failure-to-accommodate cause of action are: (1) the plaintiff has a disabilityunder FEHA; (2) the plaintiff is qualified to perform the essential functions of the position; and (3) theemployer failed to reasonably accommodate the plaintiff’s disability. (Lui v. City and County of SanFrancisco (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 962, 970.) Under Gov. Code § 12940(m), an employer is liable forfailure to accommodate where an employee requests a specific and available reasonableaccommodation that the employer fails to provide. (Nadaf-Rahrov v. Neiman Marcus Group, Inc. (2008)166 Cal.App.4th 952, 983.) Employers must make a reasonable accommodation for the knowndisabilities of employees to enable them to perform a position’s essential functions, unless doing sowould produce undue hardship to the employer’s operations. (Gov. C. § 12940(m); 2 Cal.C.Regs. §11068(a); Fisher v. Sup. Ct. (Alpha Therapeutic Corp.)(1986) 177 Cal.App.3d 779, 783.)As set forth above, Plaintiff does not sufficiently allege that: she had a disability; Defendant knewof any alleged disability; or that she was qualified to perform the essential functions of her position. Inaddition, while Plaintiff alleges that she asked for time off, it does not appear from the allegations of theComplaint that this was a request for an accommodation. Accordingly, Plaintiff fails to allege sufficientfacts to state a cause of action for failure to accommodate, and the demurrer to this cause of actionshould be sustained.C. Failure to Engage in the Interactive ProcessThe FEHA requirement of a good-faith interactive process with a disabled employee requires aninformal process with the employee to attempt to identify reasonable accommodations. (Nealy v. City ofSanta Monica (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 359, 379.) Both the employer and the employee are responsiblefor participating in the interactive process, but typically, the employee must initiate the process unlessthe disability and resulting limitations are obvious. (Featherstone v. Southern California PermanenteMedical Group (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 1150, 1169.) To prevail on a FEHA claim for failure to engage in theinteractive process, an employee must identify a reasonable accommodation that would have beenavailable at the time the interactive process occurred. (Id.)In the present case, as discussed above, the allegations are insufficient to show Plaintiff had adisability; Defendant knew about the disability; and/or that Plaintiff requested reasonableaccommodation. Accordingly, the demurrer to this cause of action is sustained.D. Race DiscriminationTo plead a claim for race discrimination under FEHA, a plaintiff must allege the following elements:“(1) the employee’s membership in a classification protected by the statute; (2) discriminatory animus onthe part of the employer toward members of that classification; (3) an action by the employer adverse tothe employee’s interests; (4) a causal link between the discriminatory animus and the adverse action; (5)damage to the employee; and (6) a causal link between the adverse action and the damage.” (Mamou v.Trendwest Resorts, Inc. (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 686, 713.) [emphasis added].) An adverse employmentaction is defined “generally as one that materially affect[s] the terms and conditions of employment.”(Featherstone v. S. Cal. Permanente Med. Grp. (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 1150, 1161 [quoting Yanowitz v.L’Oreal USA Inc. (2005) 36 Cal.4th 1028, 1051, fn. 9].)In the present case, Plaintiff alleges she is black, and therefore a member of a protected class,and that she suffered adverse employment actions, including being placed on administrative leave,demotion, and termination. (Complaint at ¶¶ 8-10, 30-34.) However, Plaintiff does not allege facts thatshow a discriminatory animus on the part of Defendant, or a causal connection between thediscriminatory animus and the adverse action. Accordingly, her cause of action is not sufficiently pledand the demurrer to this cause of action is sustained.E. Race Harassment/Hostile Work EnvironmentIn order to state a cause of action for racial harassment under FEHA, a plaintiff must allege: (1)she was subjected to unwelcome harassment; (2) the harassment complained of was based on plaintiff’srace; and (3) the harassment complained of was sufficiently pervasive so as to alter the conditions ofemployment and create an abusive working environment. (Fisher v. San Pedro Peninsula Hosp. (1989) 214Cal.App.3d 590, 608.) To constitute harassment, the conduct must be so objectively severe or pervasiveas “‘to create a hostile or abusive working environment.’” (Serri v. Santa Clara Univ. (2014) 226Cal.App.4th 830, 870.) Factors to consider in this context include the frequency of the conduct, its severity,whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, and whether it unreasonably interferes with theemployee’s work performance. (Id.) “In determining what constitutes ‘sufficiently pervasive’ harassment,the courts have held that acts of harassment cannot be occasional, isolated, sporadic, or trivial, rather theplaintiff must show a concerted pattern of harassment of a repeated, routine or a generalized nature.”(Fisher, supra, 214 Cal.App.3d at 610.)Plaintiff alleges she was subjected to harassment due to her race, which is sufficient to meet thefirst two elements of this cause of action. Plaintiff then alleges that “Defendant engaged in a pattern andpractice of racial harassment that was severe and pervasive.” (Complaint at ¶¶ 76-77.) However, thisconclusory statement is not supported by the specific allegations of the Complaint. Instead, the followingallegations are the total specific racial comments alleged to have been made to (or in the presence of)Plaintiff: in early 2019, Wood commented that Plaintiff is from “a rough urban area where all of the ethnicpeople live” [Complaint at ¶ 15]; in late 2019, Larson said “what’s up N-word” to Plaintiff once [Complaintat ¶ 16]; in July 2020, Wood asked Plaintiff he opinion about the George Floyd protests and then told herhe had a right to get his gun and shoot protesters [Complaint at ¶ 17]; also in July 2020, Rabidou wore acostume that made him resemble Abraha Lincoln and was asked, in Plaintiff's presence, if he was “freeingthe slaves this week” [Complaint at ¶ 18]; and in April 2023, Cole gave Plaintiff a copy of the film “CreatedEqual” by US Supreme Court Justice Clarence Thomas and told her to watch it while he and Wood laughed[Complaint at ¶ 27].Five instances over the course of over four years is not a high frequency; the comments/conduct,while unpleasant, are occasional and sporadic; the conduct is not physically threatening or humiliating;and Plaintiff does not allege that the comments/conduct interfered with her work. Therefore, Plaintifffails to allege facts showing the alleged harassment was severe or pervasive. (See, Serri, supra, 226Cal.App.4th at 870; Fisher, supra, 214 Cal.App.3d at 610.) Accordingly, the demurrer to this cause of actionis sustained.F. Retaliation for Requesting AccommodationsLabor Code § 12940(m) states it is unlawful for an employer to retaliate against a person forrequesting an accommodation. (Id.) To establish a prima facie case of retaliation, plaintiff must showthat (1) she engaged in a protected activity; (2) the employer subjected plaintiff to an adverseemployment action; and (3) a causal link exists between the protected activity and the employer’saction. (Yanowitz v. L’Oreal USA, Inc. (2005) 36 Cal.4th 1028, 1042.) A causal link may be established byinference derived from circ*mstantial evidence, including the proximity in time between the protectedaction and alleged retaliatory employment decision. (Morgan v. Regents of Univ. of Calif. (2000) 88Cal.App.4th 52, 69.)Here, as set forth above, Plaintiff fails to allege facts showing she requested an accommodation,i.e., engaged in a protected activity. Accordingly, she fails to allege sufficient facts to support this causeof action and the demurrer is sustained.G. Retaliation in Violation of Gov. Code § 12940(h)Pursuant to Gov. Code § 12940(h), it is an unlawful employment practice for an employer “todischarge, expel, or otherwise discriminate against any person because the person has opposed anypractices forbidden [by FEHA] or because the person has filed a complaint, testified, or assisted in anyproceeding under [FEHA].” (Gov. Code § 12940(h).) As with the prior cause of action, in order to establisha prima facie case of retaliation under either subsection, a plaintiff must a plaintiff must show: (1) he orshe engaged in a protected activity; (2) the employer subjected the employee to an adverse employmentaction; and (3) a causal link existed between the protected activity and the employer’s action. (Yanowitz,supra, 36 Cal.4th 1028, 1042; Cornell v. Berkeley Tennis Club (2017) 18 Cal.App.5th 908, 942.)In the present case, to support this cause of action, Plaintiff alleges, in a conclusory fashion, thatshe engaged in a protected activity and Defendant retaliated. (Complaint at ¶¶ 90-91.) She does notidentify what protected activity she engaged in. She also does not allege facts to show a causal connectionbetween any alleged protected activity and the adverse employment actions. Accordingly, she fails toallege sufficient facts to support this cause of action and the demurrer is sustained.H. Failure to Prevent Discrimination, Harassment, and RetaliationFailure to take all reasonable steps to prevent discrimination, harassment, and retaliation fromoccurring is another unlawful employment practice under FEHA. (Gov. Code, §12904(k).) When aplaintiff seeks to recover damages based on a claim of an employer’s failure to prevent discrimination orharassment in violation of FEHA, three essential elements must be shown: (1) the plaintiff was subjectedto discrimination, harassment, or retaliation; and (2) the defendant failed to take all reasonable steps toprevent discrimination, harassment, or retaliation; and (3) this failure caused the plaintiff to sufferinjury, damage, loss, or harm. (Gov. Code, §12940(k); Trujillo v. North County Transit District (1998) 63Cal.App.4th 280, 288-289.) Here, without sufficiently pleading the underlying claims for discrimination,harassment, and/or retaliation in violation of FEHA, Plaintiff cannot state a claim for failure to preventthis unlawful conduct. Accordingly, the demurrer to this cause of action is sustained.The Demurrer is Sustained with 30 days leave to amend.

Ruling

DONE VENTURES LLC VS JERRY JAMGOTCHIAN ET AL

Aug 08, 2024 |BC674357

Case Number: BC674357 Hearing Date: August 8, 2024 Dept: 20 Tentative Ruling Judge Kevin C. Brazile Department 20 Hearing Date: August 8, 2024 Case Name: DONE! Ventures, LLC v. Jamgotchian, et al. Case No.: BC674357 Matter: Motion for Attorneys Fees Moving Party: Plaintiff Coastal Laundromat, Inc. Responding Party: Defendants El Segundo Plaza Associates L.P. and Theta Holding IV, Inc. Notice: OK Ruling: The Motion is granted in part. Coastal to give notice. If counsel do not submit on the tentative, they are strongly encouraged to appear by LACourtConnect rather than in person due to the COVID-19 pandemic. On February 7, 2023, a jury entered verdicts in favor of Plaintiffs DONE! Ventures, LLC (Done!) and Coastal Laundromat, Inc. (Coastal), and against Defendants Jerry Jamgotchian, El Segundo Plaza Associates L.P. (ESPA), and Theta Holding IV, Inc. (Theta) for Plaintiffs claims for interference with contract, negligent interference with prospective economic advantage, and breach of contract. On May 8, 2023, the Court entered a judgment on the verdict. On July 12, 2023, the Court ruled on a motion for new trial/JNOV, stating that the amount of punitive damages awarded by the jury was improper and that Coastal was either to stipulate to $525,000 or else the Court would grant a new trial only as to the amount of punitive damages. Coastal stipulated to taking less punitive damages. On September 5, 2023, the Court ruled on Coastals motion for attorneys fees and prejudgment interest. Prejudgment interest was rejected, but the Court awarded $357,673 in fees. On February 6, 2024, the Court entered a final ruling denying Defendants motion to tax costs with respect to Done!. That ruling also rejected prejudgment interest for Done!. On February 27, 2024, the Court entered an amended judgment, which reduced the amount of punitive damages to be obtained by Done! and indicated the amount of fees, costs, and prejudgment interest to be awarded as discussed above. On March 27, 2024, the Court denied Defendants request to amend the February 27, 2024, judgment as follows: (1) amend title of the Courts February 27, 2024, judgment to read Final Judgment and not its current incorrect and misleading title, Amended Judgment, (2) Amend the date of the Courts award of post-judgment interest from May 8, 2023 (date of the Courts interim, non-final jury verdict judgment) to the date of final judgment, or February 27, 2024 (the date the Court signed final judgment in this case, erroneously entitled Amended Judgment, as above), as the May 8, 2023 interim judgment is void and no longer has any force and effect by operation of law. The Court also denied Defendants request to quash all outstanding levies issued under the Courts interim - and now void and unenforceable - May 8, 2023 jury verdict judgment. Coastal now seeks an order awarding it attorneys' fees incurred for the period between July 25, 2023 and March 31, 2024 in dealing with post-judgment matters and enforcement of the judgment. The total amount sought by this motion is $122,488, and the fees are sought jointly and severally against judgment debtors Theta Holding IV, Inc. and El Segundo Plaza Associates, L.P. and in favor of Coastal Laundromat, Inc. As mentioned, on September 5, 2023, the Court awarded attorneys fees to Coastal as a prevailing party and stated, the lease with ESPA allows for contractual fees, and the purchase agreement with Theta also allows for tort fees. Therefore, fees can be awarded against both ESPA and Theta. This finding applies equally here, and fees are further permissible under Code Civ. Proc. § 685.040. The subject fee request is as follows: Hill Farrer & Burrill: 42.4 hours by Mr. Hix at $565.00 per hour ($23,956) and 1.4 hours by Michael Collins at $600 per hour ($840) for a total of $24,796.00; Kyle P. Kelley: 97.2 hours at $635.00 per hour for a total of $61,722; andGretchen Lichtenberger: 101.8 hours at $350.00 per hour for a total of $35,630.00 in fees. Kelley is a collections attorney that has successfully pursued two cases against Jamgotchian in the past. Kelley is a member of the California State Bar and often litigates in California, despite living in Texas. Lichtenberger is a paralegal that often works with Kelley. Kelley and Lichtenberger provide a succinct and reasonable explanation as to how fees were allocated between Coastal and Done! within their declarations. Defendants present an endless bevy of arguments against the subject fee request that can be summarized in the Conclusion section of their briefing. The Court has considered these arguments and finds that they mostly lack merit as being unsubstantiated, speculative, or plain false. The only adjustment the Court will make is to reduce the hourly rate of Kelley from $635 to $500 and the rate of Lichtenberger from $350 to $250. In sum, the Motion for Attorneys Fees is granted in part. A proposed order is to be submitted accordingly. The Requests for Judicial Notice are granted. The objections are overruled. Coastal to give notice. If counsel do not submit on the tentative, they are strongly encouraged to appear by LACourtConnect rather than in person due to the COVID-19 pandemic.

Ruling

DANIEL CHU VS GRCA2 DEVELOPMENT, LLC, A DELAWARE LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY, ET AL.

Aug 07, 2024 |22STCV24782

Case Number: 22STCV24782 Hearing Date: August 7, 2024 Dept: 78 Superior Court of California County of Los Angeles Department 78 ¿ DANIEL CHU, Plaintiff(s), vs. GRCA2 DEVELOPMENT, LLC, et al., Defendant(s). Case No.:¿ 22STCV24782 Hearing Date: August 7, 2024 [TENTATIVE] ORDER CONTINUING DEFENDANTS MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT The Court requires more time to review and consider the briefs. On the Court's own motion, the Hearing on Motion for Summary Judgment scheduled for August 7, 2024 is continued to _________________in Department 78 at Stanley Mosk Courthouse. Moving Party is ordered to give notice. DATED: August 6, 2024 __________________________ Hon. Michelle C. Kim Judge of the Superior Court PLEASE TAKE NOTICE: " Parties are encouraged to meet and confer after reading this tentative ruling to see if they can reach an agreement. " If a party intends to submit on this tentative ruling, the party must send an email to the court at SMCDEPT78@lacourt.org with the Subject line SUBMIT followed by the case number. The body of the email must include the hearing date and time, counsels contact information, and the identity of the party submitting. " Unless all parties submit by email to this tentative ruling, the parties should arrange to appear remotely (encouraged) or in person for oral argument. You should assume that others may appear at the hearing to argue. " If the parties neither submit nor appear at hearing, the Court may take the motion off calendar or adopt the tentative ruling as the order of the Court. After the Court has issued a tentative ruling, the Court may prohibit the withdrawal of the subject motion without leave.

Ruling

Aug 08, 2024 |22STCV32363

Case Number: 22STCV32363 Hearing Date: August 8, 2024 Dept: 37 HEARING DATE: Monday, July 22, 2024 CASE NUMBER: 22STCV32363 CASE NAME: Boyle Flats Food & Beverage, Inc., et al. v. Alex Koons MOVING PARTY: Defendant Daleyn Accountancy, Inc. OPPOSING PARTY: Plaintiffs/Cross-Defendants Boyle Flats Food & Beverage, Inc. and Ted Yenawine TRIAL DATE: Not Set PROOF OF SERVICE: OK PROCEEDING: Demurrer with Motion to Strike Third Amended Complaint OPPOSITION: 08 July 2024 REPLY: 12 July 2024 TENTATIVE: Defendant Daleyns demurrer is sustained with leave to amend. The motion to strike is denied. Plaintiff is granted 30 days leave to amend. The court sets the OSC RE: Amended Complaint for _, at 8:30 a.m. Defendant to give notice. Background This is an action arising out of the formation of a California entity, Plaintiff Boyle Flats Food and Beverage, Inc dba Purgatory Pizza (BFFB) by Plaintiff Tad Yenawine (Yenawine) and Defendant Alex Koons (Koons). Plaintiffs and Defendant operated a restaurant business thus called Purgatory Pizza. The Complaint alleges Defendant took monies from Plaintiff BFFBs bank accounts for expenses to open his own pizza restaurant in 2020. The Complaint alleges Defendant applied for and received an Emergency Incident Disaster Loan (EIDL) in BFFBs name which was transferred to Defendants own account and no payments were made by Defendant for the EIDL afterwards. The Complaint also alleges Defendant abandoned his duties as manager of Purgatory Pizza and continued to pay himself his salary.¿¿ TheComplaint alleges the four causes of action: (1) breach of contract; (2) conversion; (3) fraud; and (4) breach of fiduciary duty.¿¿ On June 23, 2021, Petitioner filed a Request for Dismissal without prejudice as to his claim for writ of mandate.¿¿ On October 23, 2023, Defendant Coons filed the operative Third Amended Cross-Complaint (TACC) alleging four causes of action: (1) Dissolution of Corporation, (2) Breach of Fiduciary Duty Derivative, (3) Breach of Fiduciary Duty Individual, and (4) Failure to Reimburse Business Expenses. On February 28, 2024, the court sustained the demurrer of Defendant Daleyn Accountancy, Inc. (Daleyn) to the First Amended Complaint with leave to amend. On May 28, 2023, Plaintiffs filed the operative Third Amended Complaint (TAC) alleging eight causes of action against Defendants Koons, Daleyn, and Does 2 to 10. The TAC alleges: 1) Breach of Contract against Defendant Koons; 2) Conversion - against Defendant Koons; 3) Fraud - against Defendant Koons; 4) Breach of Fiduciary Duty - against Defendant Koons; 5) Breach of Contract against Defendant Daleyn; 6) Conversion against Defenant Daleyn; 7) Fraud against Defendant Daleyn; and 8) Breach of Fiduciary Duty - against Defendant Daleyn; The TAC alleges that Defendant Daleyn is an accounting corporation, the former corporate accountant for Plaintiff BFFB, and the current corporate accountant for Hot Tongue Pizza and the personal accountant for the Koons family. (TAC, ¶ 4.) Defendant Daleyn now moves to strike the TAC and demurs to the TAC. Plaintiffs oppose both motions. The matter is now before the court. request for JUDICIAL notice The court may take judicial notice of official acts of the legislative, executive, and judicial departments of the United States and of any state of the United States, [r]ecords of (1) any court of this state or (2) any court of record of the United States or of any state of the United States, and [f]acts and propositions that are not reasonably subject to dispute and are capable of immediate and accurate determination by resort to sources of reasonably indisputable accuracy. (Evid. Code § 452, subds. (c), (d), and (h).) Taking judicial notice of a document is not the same as accepting the truth of its contents or accepting a particular interpretation of its meaning. (Joslin v. H.A.S. Ins. Brokerage (1986) 184 Cal.App.3d 369, 374.) Defendant Daleyn requests judicial notice of the following: 1) Exhibit B: BFFBs corporate bylaws. (Russell Decl., Ex. B; see also Ex. C.) 2) Exhibit C: Boyle Flats Food & Beverage, Inc. Action By Written Consent In Lieu Of Meeting of Board of Directors. (Russel Decl. ¶ 7, Ex C [04/06/2023 Decl. of Koons, Ex. A].) Defendant Daleyns request for judicial notice is granted. The court takes judicial notice of BFFBs Bylaws and BFFBs Action by Written Consent but not the declarations and other attachments as the authenticity of those documents has not been established nor acquiesced to by the parties. The existence and content of the BFFBs Bylaws and BFFBs Action by Written Consent are not disputed by the parties, only the interpretation of these documents. Accordingly, judicial notice is appropriate. Discussion I. Legal Standard A. Motion to Strike ¿Any party, within the time allowed to respond to a pleading may serve and file a notice of motion to strike the whole or any part thereof. (CCP § 435(b)(1); CRC, rule 3.1322(b).) The court may, upon a motion or at any time in its discretion and upon terms it deems proper: (1) strike out any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading; or (2) strike out all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of California, a court rule, or an order of the court. (CCP § 436(a)-(b); Stafford v. Shultz (1954) 42 Cal.2d 767, 782 [Matter in a pleading which is not essential to the claim is surplusage; probative facts are surplusage and may be stricken out or disregarded].)¿¿¿¿ B. Demurrer A demurrer is an objection to a pleading, the grounds for which are apparent from either the face of the complaint or a matter of which the court may take judicial notice. (CCP § 430.30(a); see also Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.)¿To survive a demurrer, the complaint need only allege facts sufficient to state a cause of action; each evidentiary fact that might eventually form part of the plaintiffs proof need not be alleged.¿(C.A. v. William S. Hart Union High School Dist. (2012) 53 Cal.4th 861, 872.)¿For the purpose of testing the sufficiency of the cause of action, the demurrer admits the truth of all material facts properly pleaded.¿ (Aubry v. Tri-City Hospital Dist. (1992) 2 Cal.4th 962, 966-967.)¿A demurrer does not admit contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law.¿(Daar v. Yellow Cab Co. (1967) 67 Cal.2d 695, 713.)¿¿ C. Leave to Amend Where the defect raised by a motion to strike or by demurrer is reasonably capable of cure, leave to amend is routinely and liberally granted to give the plaintiff a chance to cure the defect in question. (CLD Construction, Inc. v. City of San Ramon (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 1141, 1146.) The burden is on the complainant to show the Court that a pleading can be amended successfully. (Goodman v. Kennedy (1976) 18 Cal.3d 335, 348.)¿¿¿ II. Motion to Strike Defendant Daleyn moves to strike the entire TAC because under the 4/23/2024 Stipulation, the court ordered Plaintiffs to file the TAC on or before May 14, 2024, but the TAC was not filed until May 28, 2024. Plaintiffs assert that the May 28, 2024, Order required Plaintiffs to file the TAC within 15 days of receipt of notice and Plaintiffs did not serve the notice until May 13, 2024, making the May 28, 2024, filing timely. The court denies the motion to strike on the basis that Defendant Daleyn suffered no prejudice in Plaintiffs delay in filing the TAC and this case should be tried on the merits. Leave to amend may be denied if there is prejudice to the opposing party, such as delay in trial, loss of critical evidence, or added costs of preparation. (Bidari v. Kelk (2023) 90 Cal.App.5th 1152, 1173.) Moreover, even if the court were to grant the motion to strike pursuant to Leader v. Health Industries of America, Inc. (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 603, 613, Plaintiffs would be given leave to amend. Accordingly, the motion to strike is denied and the court addresses the demurrer on the merits. III. Demurrer[1] A. Yenawines Lack of Standing to Bring Action on Behalf of BFFB Defendant Daleyn asserts that under Anmaco, Inc. v. Bohlken (1993) 13 Cal.App.4th (Anmaco), Plaintiff Yenawine lacks standing to bring an action on behalf of Plaintiff BFFB. As previously noted by this court in its February 28, 2024, ruling, the Anmaco Court found that because a corporate president has no greater power than any other director, the president had no power to initiate a lawsuit in the name of the corporation against a co-director and equal shareholder. (Id. at p. 900.) Pressing the corporation into litigation as a plaintiff is inappropriate where the other shareholder-director could claim equal authority to bring suit in the corporate name. This is particularly obvious in the instant case where Bohlken is not only an equal director and shareholder, but is also Chief Executive Officer of the company. The proper vehicle for such a suit, when the gravamen of the complaint is injury to the corporation, is a shareholders derivative action. (Id. at p. 900.) In opposition, Plaintiffs argue that the Anmaco does not apply. We express no view on the president's power to institute or defend litigation in an emergency or involving an outsider or where the bylaws may grant the power to do so. (Anmaco, supra, 13 Cal.App.4th at p. 900, fn. 2.) The TAC does not allege that Plaintiff Yenawine's authority to initiate this action stemmed from an emergency or involved an outsider in a manner that would permit Yenawine to file this action. Plaintiffs cite no statute or case law that would permit Yenawine, as President of BFFB, to initiate an action against a third party without board approval. The Anmaco Court was clear that when the bylaws of the corporation do not permit the President to act without board approval [t]he president does not have the power to enter into contracts or execute other instruments or render the corporation liable for any purposes or any amount without Board authorization including the power to institute litigation in the corporate name against the other 50 percent shareholder. (Anmaco, supra, 13 Cal.App.4th at p. 898.) Plaintiffs ignored other persuasive authority cited by this court stating, the relevant inquiry is whether the president has authority to initiate any suit on behalf of the corporation when the directors are deadlocked. (Icon Internet Media, Inc. v. Johnson (C.D. Cal., Oct. 22, 2021, No. 819CV01579FLADFMX) 2021 WL 6104314, at *4 [underline original].) The California position with reference to the authority of corporate officers has been strict. Even the president, apart from acts done in the course of ordinary business, or in pursuance of apparent authority depends upon the powers conferred upon him, either by statute, corporate charter, by-laws or the directors. The mere fact that he is president, without more, does not necessarily give him greater power than any other director. (Sealand Inv. Corp. v. Emprise Inc. (1961) 190 Cal.App.2d 305, 321322; see also O'Flaherty v. Belgum (2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 1044, 1062.) Plaintiffs opposition takes the position that there are provisions in the BFFBs bylaws that permit Yenawine to initiate this action. In a conclusory manner, the TAC alleges Plaintiff Yenawine has standing to bring this action, under Corporations Code §§312, 315 and 316(c) and under terms of the BFFB bylaws and Board of Directors resolutions. (TAC, ¶ 2.) Plaintiffs BFFB and Yenawine have standing to sue Daleyn under Corporations Code §207, 315, 316(c), and the BFFB corporate Bylaws and resolutions. (TAC, ¶ 47.) The TAC fails to attach the bylaws to the complaint and fails to state under what specific provisions of the BFFB bylaws or under what specific board of director resolutions did Yenawine have the authority to bring this action. Without such facts, the allegations that Yenawine has the authority to act are conclusory. A demurrer does not admit contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law. (Daar v. Yellow Cab Co. (1967) 67 Cal.2d 695, 713.) Furthermore, Plaintiffs opposition fails to explain how Corp. Code §§ 207, 312, 315, and 316(c) give Yenawine the authority to bring this action against Daleyn. Plaintiffs point out that under Corp. Code, § 315(a), a majority of shareholders are needed to approve the loan to Koons, yet Plaintiffs fail to explain how majority shareholder approval gives Yenawine standing to initiate this action against Daleyn on behalf of BFFB. (See Opposition, at p. 3:27-4:2.) Plaintiff fails to cite case law showing that Yenawine as President and without board approval had the right to commence this action and what specific corporate bylaw or corporate duty Yenawine was enforcing in suing Daleyn. Lastly, the court declines to interpret BFFBs bylaws to determine if they give Yenawine the right to bring suit on behalf of BFFB without board approval when the specific provisions are not cited in the pleadings and the parties dispute the interpretation of those provisions. The hearing on demurrer may not be turned into a contested evidentiary hearing through the guise of having the court take judicial notice of documents whose truthfulness or proper interpretation are disputable. (Fremont Indemnity Co. v. Fremont General Corp. (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 97, 114; see also Del E. Webb Corp. v. Structural Materials Co. (1981) 123 Cal.App.3d 593, 605.) Moreover, matters that may be judicially noticed are dispositive only in those instances where there is not or cannot be a factual dispute concerning that which is sought to be judicially noticed. (Cruz v. County of Los Angeles (1985) 173 Cal.App.3d 1131, 1134.) Should Defendants wish the court to determine if the bylaws give Yenawine standing to sue on behalf of BFFB, Defendants should bring a motion for summary judgment, or summary adjudication, so that the court can address the issue on the merits. Interpretation of a written instrument becomes solely a judicial function only when it is based on the words of the instrument alone, when there is no conflict in the extrinsic evidence, or when a determination was made based on incompetent evidence. (City of Hope National Medical Center v. Genentech, Inc. (2008) 43 Cal.4th 375, 395.) The demurrer to the entire complaint is sustained with leave to amend. The court next addresses Daleyns specific demurrer to the fourth, fifth, sixth, and seventh causes of action but issues no ruling as the demurrer to the entire TAC is already sustained. B. Fifth Cause of Action - Summary of Allegations against Defendant Daleyn On July 29, 2020, Defendant Daleyn contracted with Plaintiff BFFB to provide accounting and business advisory services (the Daleyn Contract). (TAC, ¶ 44, Ex. A.) Under Section VI of the Daleyn Contract, Daleyn was obligated to keep BFFBs financial and business operations information confidential and not misuse the information. (TAC, ¶ 45.) Section IV of the Daleyn Contract states: VI. CONFIDENTIALITY Any confidential information (including all technology, processes, trade secrets, contracts, proprietary information; the nature of the information and the manner of disclosure are such that a reasonable person would understand it to be confidential) exchanged between the Accountant and the Client in connection with the performance of the Services shall be held by the Accountant in trust for the benefit of the Client only, and the Accountant will not divulge or authorize anyone to divulge during the term of this Contract, or any period thereafter, any information or knowledge acquired in the course of its performance. (TAC, ¶ 45, Ex. 1.) The TAC alleges that when Defendant Koons began to develop plans to operate his own competing pizza restaurant, Koons contracted with Daleyn to provide accounting and business advisory services to Koons. (TAC, ¶ 47.) Daleyn became aware that Koons was taking money from BFFB bank accounts to fund his separate business. (TAC, ¶ 47.) Daleyn breached the Daleyn Contract by concealing from BFFB and its Director, Yenawine, Koons theft. (TAC, ¶¶ 47, 49.) The TAC also alleges that Daleyn suggested Koons file an Economic Injury Disaster Loan (EIDL) application in BFFBs name, with the intent that the proceeds of the loan be diverted to Koons not-yet existent new business. (TAC, ¶ 48.) Daleyn and Koons failed to report to Plaintiffs that an EIDL had been submitted in BFFBs name and that such an application would expose Plaintiffs to potential civil and criminal penalties under federal law because Defendants intended to divert the loan proceeds to Koons new business. (TAC, ¶ 48.) Section VI prevents Daleyn from divulging confidential information to third parties but does not necessarily obligate Daleyn to disclose Koons conduct to Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs opposition fails to cite case law showing that the duty to maintain confidentiality requires a party to divulge information to the other party. However, the court finds that violations premised on Section V rather than Section VI may allow Plaintiffs to state a viable breach of contract claim, if Plaintiff Yenawine has standing to sue on behalf of BFFB. (See TAC, ¶ 64.) C. Sixth Cause of Action Conversion To plead a cause of action for conversion, one must allege: (1) the plaintiffs ownership or right to possession of personal property; (2) defendants disposition of the property inconsistent with plaintiffs rights; and (3) resulting damages. (Fremont Indemnity Co. v. Fremont General Corp.(2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 97, 119.) Money may be the subject of conversion if the claim involves a specific, identifiable sum . . . . (WelcoElectronics, Inc. v. Mora(2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 202, 209.) The TAC alleges that Daleyn assisted Koons in converting not less than $949,000 from BFFBs accounts. (TAC, ¶ 54.) As the TAC fails to state that a specific sum was converted or that the sum can become identifiable, the court would be inclined to sustain the demurrer to the sixth cause of action with leave to amend. (See SP Investment Fund I LLC v. Cattell (2017) 18 Cal.App.5th 898.) Moreover, the court agrees that the TAC fails to allege that Daleyn disposed or exercised dominion over the converted funds. D. Seventh Cause of Action Fraud The elements of fraud, which give rise to the tort action for deceit, are (a) misrepresentation (false representation, concealment, or nondisclosure); (b) knowledge of falsity (or scienter); (c) intent to defraud, i.e., to induce reliance; (d) justifiable reliance; and (e) resulting damage. (Lazar v. Superior Court¿(1996) 12 Cal.4th 631, 638.) In California, fraud must be pled specifically; general and conclusory allegations do not suffice.¿(Id. at p. 645.) The TAC alleges that in July 2020, Daleyn assisted Koons in fraudulently preparing and applying for an EIDL loan in BFFBs name without the Plaintiffs permission or authorization. (TAC, ¶ 56.) The TAC alleges that by not disclosing the fraudulent loan, Daleyn acted in violation of her statutory duties to BFFB and its directors. (TAC, ¶¶ 48, 56.) In addition, in June 2020, Daleyn advised Plaintiffs to execute a lease agreement personally guaranteed by Plaintiff Yenawine for a new location for BFFB when it was in fact a location for Koons planned separate business. (TAC, ¶¶ 27, 57.) In December 2020, Daleyn drafted a loan agreement wherein BFFB would loan Koons $150,000 despite knowing that Koons had converted at least $479,900 of BFFBs money for Koons personal use and that Koons had no intention of replaying the loan. (TAC, ¶ 58.) Daleyn had no reasonable expectation that Koons would repay the loan. (TAC, ¶ 58.) Moreover, Daleyn concealed Koons conversion and fraudulent EIDL loan application and diversion. (TAC, ¶ 58.) Plaintiffs reasonably relied on Daleyns fraudulent representations based on the written Daleyn Contract and Daleyns status as a state-licensed accounting firm with duties governed by state accountancy licensing law. (TAC, ¶ 60.) Daleyns omissions and failure to disclose caused Plaintiffs damages as Daleyn was helping Koons at the expense of Plaintiffs. (TAC, ¶ 61.) The court agrees that the TAC fails to allege that Daleyn intentionally concealed facts about Koons conduct with the intent to defraud Plaintiff. The TAC also fails to allege that Daleyn knowingly concealed or suppressed facts about Koons actions. E. Eighth Cause of Action Breach of Fiduciary Duty The elements of a cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty are the existence of a fiduciary relationship, its breach, and damage proximately caused by that breach. (Meister v. Mensinger (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 381, 395.) A fiduciary relationship is any relation existing between parties to a transaction wherein one of the parties is duty bound to act with the utmost good faith for the benefit of the other party. (Cleveland v. Johnson (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 1315, 1338.) Such a relation ordinarily arises where a confidence is reposed by one person in the integrity of another. (Ibid.) [B]efore a person can be charged with a fiduciary obligation, he must either knowingly undertake to act on behalf and for the benefit of another, or must enter into a relationship which imposes that undertaking as a matter of law. (Ibid.) Plaintiffs assert that the breach of the Daleyn Contract was a breach of Daleyns statutory duties owed to Plaintiffs pursuant to Cal. Code of Reg 16:56-56.3 and 16.57. (TAC, ¶ 63, Ex. A.) Plaintiffs also assert Daleyn breaches section V.(b) of the Daleyn Contract. (TAC, ¶ 64.) Defendant Daleyn asserts that under the Daleyn contract, a fiduciary relationship only exists between Daleyn and BFFB, not Yenawine. Therefore, Yenawine cannot assert a claim for breach of fiduciary duty. Daleyn also asserts that the TAC fails to allege that Plaintiffs did not consent to Daleyns conduct. (CACI 4102.) The court finds that the TAC does not specifically allege which specific statutes impose a fiduciary duty of Daleyn or case law that extends such duty to Yenawine as President of BFFB. Conclusion Defendant Daleyns demurrer is sustained with leave to amend. The motion to strike is denied. Plaintiff is granted 10 days leave to amend. The court sets the OSC RE: Amended Complaint for August 30, 2024, at 8:30 a.m. Defendant to give notice. [1] Pursuant to CCP §§ 430.41, 435.5(a), the meet and confer requirement has been met. (See 04/23/2024 Stipulation to File TAC)

Ruling

Leaf Capital Funding, LLC vs. Sabrina Green

Aug 07, 2024 |23CECG02532

Re: Leaf Capital Funding, LLC v. Green, et al. Superior Court Case No. 23CECG02532Hearing Date: August 7, 2024 (Dept. 503)Motion: by Plaintiff for an Order Striking the Answer as to Defendant Sabrina Green and Entering DefaultTentative Ruling: To order terminating sanctions. The court strikes the Answer as to defendantSabrina Green. Plaintiff may submit an application for default against defendant SabrinaGreen. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2023.030.)Explanation: Code of Civil Procedure section 2023.010 defines “misuses of the discoveryprocess” as including, “failing to respond or submit to an authorized method of discovery”and “disobeying a court order to provide discovery.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2023.010, subds.(d) & (g).) Code of Civil Procedure section 2023.030 states, in relevant part: To the extent authorized by the chapter governing any particular discovery method or any other provision of this title, the court, after notice to any affected party, person, or attorney, and after opportunity for hearing, may impose the following sanctions against anyone engaging in conduct that is a misuse of the discovery process: [¶] . . . [¶] (d) The court may impose a terminating sanction by one of the following orders: [¶] . . . [¶] (1) An order striking out the pleadings or parts of the pleadings of any party engaging in the misuse of the discovery process. [¶] . . . [¶] (4) An order rendering a judgment by default against that party. Noncompliance with compelled discovery justifies terminating sanctions, and, inaddition, monetary sanctions. (See Code Civ. Proc., §§ 2030.290, subd. (c), 2031.310,subd. (i).) This court is also guided by the principle that “[t]he sanctions the court mayimpose are such as are suitable and necessary to enable the party seeking discovery toobtain the objects of the discovery he seeks but the court may not impose sanctionswhich are designed not to accomplish the objects of the discovery but to imposepunishment.” (Caryl Richards, Inc. v. Superior Court (1961) 188 Cal.App.2d 300, 304.) Here, on March 28, 2024, the court ordered defendant Sabrina Green to serveverified responses to the plaintiff’s document requests and form interrogatories within 10days of the court’s order, as well as to pay $680 in monetary sanctions to plaintiff within20 days. The court’s orders were served on Ms. Green that same day. However, Ms.Green never served verified responses to any of the discovery requests, nor has she paidthe monetary sanctions as ordered, despite the passage of more than 20 days since theorder was served on her. (See Schiern Decl., ¶ 9.) There is no evidence indicating Ms.Green has made any attempt to communicate with plaintiff’s counsel regarding thediscovery requests since the orders were made. Therefore, it appears that Ms. Green is willfully refusing to comply with the court’sorder compelling her to respond to plaintiff’s discovery requests, as well as the order topay monetary sanctions. Lesser sanctions would likely be ineffective to obtain Ms.Green’s compliance here, as it appears she has no interest in responding to plaintiff’sdiscovery or otherwise participating in the action. As a result, the court orders terminatingsanctions against Ms. Green, and strikes the Answer as to Ms. Green. Plaintiff may seekentry of default against Ms. Green by filing an application for default. Pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), and Code of Civil Proceduresection 1019.5, subdivision (a), no further written order is necessary. The minute orderadopting this tentative ruling will serve as the order of the court and service by the clerkwill constitute notice of the order.Tentative RulingIssued By: jyh on 8/6/24 . (Judge’s initials) (Date)

Ruling

ALDO L. MEJIA VS. NISSAN NORTH AMERICA, INC., A DELAWARE CORPORATION ET AL

Aug 09, 2024 |CGC23611258

Matter on the Discovery Calendar for Friday, August 9, 2024, Line 3, PLAINTIFF ALDO MEJIA's Motion To Compel Further Responses To Plaintiffs Requests For Production Of Documents, Set One. Continued to September 11, 2024, on the court's motion. No JPT available. =(525)

Ruling

FCS053772 - KUDSK, SUSAN V YEAH, HALLORAN (DMS)

Aug 10, 2024 |FCS053772

FCS053772Application for Sale of Dwelling Page 3 of 4TENTATIVE RULINGCounsel for Judgment Creditor to appear. There is no indication in the court’s fileestablishing that counsel prepared and submitted an order to show cause as ordered bythis court. There is also no proof of service demonstrating timely and proper service ofany order to show cause, a copy of the application, and a copy of the notice of hearingon Judgment Creditor and any occupant of the dwelling to be sold. Page 4 of 4

Ruling

FCS059237 - SUNDT CONSTRUCTION INC V N. CALIFORNIA OFFICE (DMS

Aug 08, 2024 |FCS059237

FCS059237Motion to Compel ArbitrationTENTATIVE RULINGThe Court (Department Seven) self recuses pursuant to CCP Section 170.1(b)(6)(iii).Pursuant to the direction of Judge Stephen Gizzi, Supervising Judge of the CivilDivision, the matter is reassigned and continued to August 1, 2024 at 9:30 a.m.,Department Three.

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